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Abstract 
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social care coordination plans. We draw upon the quasi-experimental evidence from the main 
expansion of long term care increase subsidisation in Spain in 2007 to examine the causal effect 
of the expansion of LTC subsidisation and coordination on hospitalisations (both on the internal 
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budget cuts that reduced the subsidy. We find robust evidence of a reduction in hospitalisations 
and the length of stay after the expansion of LTC subsidisation. However, the reduction in 
hospitalisations is heterogeneous to the existence of health and social care coordination plans 
and type of subsidy. Overall, we estimate savings related to hospitalisations of up to 11% of 
total hospital costs. Consistently, subsidy reduction is found to attenuate bed-blocking gains. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Health systems in an ageing society face numerous challenges, which 
include the need to respond to the rise in healthcare treatments that are 
disproportionally taken up by older individuals (Breyer et al., 2010). At the 
same time, such needs increase the demand for long-term care (LTC), which 
unlike healthcare is not equally subsidised and often provided by local 
authorities (Costa-Font et al., 2015). Such mismatch in coverage and 
coordination can put an additional strain on the delivery of health services, 
and specifically hospital care. A shortage of suitable LTC - due to limited 
insurance or public subsidy, inadequate integration and inter-jurisdictional 
coordination of health and social care (Hofmarcher et al., 2007; 
Bodenheimer, 2008)- gives rise to ‘bed-blocking’, which may lead to the 
unnecessary use of hospital care use (Mur-Veeman and Govers, 2011). The 
latter can take the form of a longer stay, a both a higher probability  and 
number of hospitalisation, and an extended length of stay. This will be the 
focus of the paper.  
A challenging aspect when measuring the effect of LTC insurance 
expansion of health care use is the endogeneity of such insurance or subsidy 
expansion, and more precisely the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
confounding such effects (e.g., common health shocks), which may lead to 
misleading findings. To overcome such problems,  and attempt to estimate 
causal effects, one ought exploit an exogenous variation in LTC funding 
expansion, typically from a the introduction of a new funding program. 
Here, we examine a quasi-natural experiment, an unexpected LTC funding 
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expansion reform in Spain, which extends the previously means-tested 
funding system to anyone that qualifies after a needs test. An additional 
feature of the Spanish reform is that the responsibility for LTC policy 
befalls the same level of government as healthcare, which could arguably 
have led to greater health and social care coordination, or allowed exploiting 
pre-existing coordination plans. We are interested in identifying the effects 
of the hypothesised reduction in hospitalisations at both the intensive and 
the extensive margin (namely, the probability of hospitalisation, the number 
of hospitalisations, and the length of stay). An addition feature in Spain is 
the decline in LTC subsidies due to the 2012 austerity cuts that we identify 
in our data. Hence, we can test whether the reversion of the subsidy 
expansion deliver comparable effects on hospitalisation. 
Our findings provide robust evidence of a reduction in hospitalisations (in 
both the intensive and the extensive margin) and in length of stay upon the 
introduction of the 2007 universal subsidy. However, the effect is different 
depending on the type of subsidy. Whilst the reduction of hospitalisations of 
home-help (in kind subsidy) subsidies was higher than an cash subsidy 
(caregiving allowance), the opposite is true for the number of 
hospitalisations in terms of reducing the length of stay. The effect size is 
heterogeneous to the prior development of health and social care 
coordination plans. We draw upon data from the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe 2004-2013, which contains a rich set of time 
varying controls both at individual and regional level, which we can use to 
measure both social and health-related needs. We are then able to produce 
baseline results that are robust to heterogeneity for coordination plans, and 
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are consistent with the effect of the decline in the subsidy after the 2012 
austerity spending cuts. The paper ends with a set of expenditure estimates 
measuring the effects of LTC subsidy on hospitalisation, and length of stay 
on hospital costs.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
literature to which the study contributes. Section three contains the 
background, data and methods. Section four contains the results and, finally, 
the paper ends with a discussion section containing its concluding remarks.  
2. Literature  
 
 
This paper studies the impact subsidisation has on LTC, and 
specifically the effect formal home and informal caregiving has on 
hospitalisations. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on both the 
coordination of health and social care and the wider health system effects of 
the expansion of LTC funding. Previous research has found mixed evidence 
regarding the effect of different programmes over hospitalisation rates.  
 
Bed-blocking. One potential question lies in examining 
hospitalisation after the introduction of social care programmes, and 
specifically of the extensive margin (probability of hospitalisation). Here, 
the literature is mixed. Some studies report a reduction in hospital 
readmission after the introduction of a home visits programme (Hermiz et 
al., 2002); others find no significant reductions in the rate of hospital 
admissions  (Balaban et al., 1988, Fabacher et al., 1994, and Stuck et al., 
1995 for the US, Van Rossum et al., 1993 for the Netherlands, and Pathy et 
7 
 
al., 1992). Alternatively, other literature examines the effect of social care 
programmes on the rate of hospitalisations. Brazil et al. (1998) find a 
reduction in hospital admissions after the implementation of a “Quick 
Response Service” (QRS) consisting of visits from registered social carers 
and nurses. Similarly, Vas et al. (2008) find a reduction in first hospital 
admissions among those people with disabilities receiving preventive home 
visits. Hendriksen et al. (1984) find that a home visit programme reduces 
the number of hospital admissions and leads to shorter hospital stays in 
Denmark. Gonçalves and Weaver (2014) have used an instrumental variable 
strategy for Switzerland to report that medically related home care reduces 
hospitalizations and primary care visits, but the same does not apply to non-
medical home care. 
The studies that use a methodology closer to ours include Picone et 
al. (2003), and Fernández and Forder (2008). The former investigate the 
simultaneous determinants of the length of hospital stay and the discharge 
destinations of US Medicare patients following a hip fracture, stroke, or 
heart attack. They find that informal care increased the probability of being 
discharged home or to a nursing facility. The latter found that those local 
authorities in the UK that provide more hours of home help, and nursing and 
residential care beds, had a lower rate of hospital-delayed discharges and 
lower emergency readmission rates. However, experimental or quasi-
experimental data are required for addressing some of the endogeneity and 
causality concerns.  
LTC Subsidisation and the Health System. Another group of studies 
assesses the evidence on coverage expansions, as we do in this paper. Rapp 
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et al. (2015) have measured the impact of financial assistance for non-
medical provision over the probability of requiring emergency care. Their 
analysis is restricted to patients with Alzheimer’s disease. They conclude 
that the beneficiaries of LTC subsidies have a significantly lower rate of 
emergency care than non-beneficiaries. Alternatively, Holmäs et al. (2008) 
have analysed the changes in the catchment areas of two large Norwegian 
hospitals. They found that changing from a system penalising municipalities 
that could not provide care services in time to another system with a 
coordinating unit that facilitated a smooth transfer process from hospital to 
LTC services involved hospital stays that were approximately 2.3 days 
shorter. However, a change in the opposite direction leads to hospital stays 
that are three days longer. Finally, Forder (2009) has used small-area data 
on 8000 census areas in England, and found that increasing spending on 
care homes by £1 reduced hospital expenditure by £0.35. 
This study seeks to fill some of the gaps in the literature. We use widely 
representative survey data with measures of hospitalisations (in both the 
intensive and extensive margin) and length of stay, and measures of 
exposure to a unique LTC reform that subsidises LTC services,  to examine 
the effect of LTC subsidisation alongside coordination on hospitalisations.  
3. Background and identification 
 
The Spanish model of long-term care. Spain has traditionally exhibited 
limited coordination between health and social care. One of the traditional 
reasons for such limited coordination falls in is the asymmetric jurisdictional 
functional allocation, and especially the existence of chronic underfunding of 
social care in the presence of strong family caregiving duties. Social care is 
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typically a local responsibility, which is subject to a needs/means test, while 
healthcare is run by the governments in the autonomous regions (Comunidades 
Autónomas), and is free at the point of need, with the exception of 
pharmaceutical co-payments. The latter puts a strain on the management of 
complex chronic illnesses, although better coordination is found to improve 
quality of life (Hofmarcher et al., 2007) and reduce costs (Singh and Ham 
2005). Overall, there is evidence to suggest that about 68% of all patients 
needing social care end up being treated by health services, and experiences of 
care management coordination find evidence of savings of up to 27% (Graces 
et al., 2006).  
Hence, for a reform to exert an influence in the health system it should 
not only coordinate health and social care by making use of different policies 
such as a joint commissioning mechanism, but also expand the funding of 
underfunded social care. Table 1 reports the different initiatives for 
introducing health and social care coordination plans in several Spanish 
regions. However, as we argue, the benefits of health and social care 
coordination only materialised when the LTC funding reform was introduced1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Spain implemented the LTC reform in 2007 (it is also known by the 
longer name ‘Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care of Dependent 
People’, we refer to it using the acronym SAAD, resulting from the name of 
the reform in Spanish), although it was formally enacted by Law 39/2006 of 14 
December 2006. The reform was effectively an unexpected expansion of public 
                                                          
1 In addition to the reform, the Spanish government published, but did not implement, a Care 
Coordination White Paper in 2011. It defined the need to transition to a ‘socio-health model’ of 
care based on the development of interdisciplinary teams and common budgets. 
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funding (resulted from a last minute agreement of a hang parliament and a 
minority government elected after the 2004 Madrid bombings) and the 
individual subsidisation of LTC contingent upon passing a stringent needs test 
that replaces the previous underfunded means-tested system2. After the reform, 
a beneficiary that qualifies after a needs test may receive an allowance to be 
cared for by informal caregivers, provided the home meets suitable standards 
of habitability in the care programme. Although the principles of the new 
regulation apply nationwide, its implementation was largely in the hands of the 
autonomous communities or regions, which proceeded at different speeds 
(Costa-Font, 2010; see Table A1). After SAAD, a universal entitlement to LTC 
was defined under equal conditions for all elderly or disabled people who need 
help to carry out basic activities of daily living (ADLs). 
The Spanish reform. Unlike the pre-reform period, when care was 
means-tested by local authorities and by the Social Security system (e.g., non-
contributory disability allowance), SAAD recognizes the universal nature of 
benefits and entitlement, and individual care assessment is carried out by every 
region to determine the services and/or benefits that best match the applicant’s 
needs. This programme is established with the participation of the beneficiary 
after the family has been consulted. The subsidy is determined by needs, which 
are classified as moderate dependency, severe dependency, or major 
dependency. However, SAAD’s speed of implementation was region-specific. 
Consequently, there was a wide variation in the percentage of beneficiaries 
                                                          
2 Spain’s LTC reforms arose from a coalition government formed by a Parliament elected three 
days after the 2004 Madrid bombings (Garcia Montalvo, 2011). The new minority socialist 
government began to announce an agreement at the end of 2006 to implement a tax-funded 
subsidisation of the LTC system. It is therefore plausible to assume that the reform was not 
expected. 
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(e.g., 3.19% in Andalusia versus 1.17% per cent in the Canaries, using data for 
2010)3. Similarly, the reliance on cash or in-kind benefits differs across 
regions, representing a high dispersion rate in the cost per dependent (e.g., 
€5,093 in the Murcia region versus €12,715 in the Madrid region, while the 
percentages of informal caregivers’ benefits with respect to total benefits 
awarded are 68.7% and 18.6%, respectively; Barriga Martí et al., 2015).  
The effect of the economic crisis on the public deficit (8.9% at the 
beginning of 2012) led to a reduction in the subsidy to control public 
expenditure. As part of the budget cuts, the generosity of the LTC subsidy was 
slashed in July 2012 (Royal Decree 20/2012, 13 July 2012). Specifically, the 
LTC subsidy for ‘moderate dependency’ was delayed until 2015; hence only 
people with severe and major dependency were supported. Among these, home 
care support fell from 70–90 hours/month to 56–70 hours/month for 
individuals with ‘major dependency’, and from 40–55 hours/month to 31–45 
hours/month for those with ‘severe dependency’. Finally, the subsidy for those 
receiving an equivalent cash allowance to pay for informal caregivers was 
reduced by between 15 and 25% conditional upon the degree of dependency, 
and the Social Security stopped paying social contributions for informal 
caregivers. 
Based on the above description, the following section examines the 
effect of the introduction of SAAD, and specifically focuses on three sources 
of heterogeneity: (i) the existence of health and social care coordination plans 
in the region, (ii) the existence of delays in the regional implementation of the 
                                                          
3 Beneficiaries with respect to the population aged 18 and over. We have used this threshold given the 
differences in the ranking scale between the population under and over the age of 18. 
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reform, and (iii) the effect of the reduction in the extent of the subsidy due to 
the 2012 austerity subsidy reductions.  
4. Data  
The survey. We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) for Wave 1 (2004), Wave 2 (2006/2007), 
Wave 4 (2011) and Wave 5 (2013)4. SHARE is the European equivalent of the 
Health and Retirement Survey, a panel dataset of interviewees born in 1960 or 
earlier, and their partners, covering Austria, Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Israel, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland. SHARE5 is the most 
comprehensive dataset available across Europe for examining the effects of 
changes in LTC subsidies among the elderly. While sample sizes vary across 
countries, the pooled dataset exceeds 100,000 individuals, from which only 
20% have some form of dependency (defined as the ADLs or instrumental 
ones–IADLs- they cannot perform). We take advantage of the fact that some of 
the interviews in the 2006 wave were carried out in 2007, and hence they allow 
us to more clearly identify the initial effects of the exposure to public insurance 
expansion. 
Our data contain records of economic benefits and public home care for 
waves 1, 2 and 5. However, wave 4  records only LTC benefits, as questions 
concerning public home care have been omitted from the questionnaire. A 
                                                          
4 Unfortunately, Wave 3 could not be included as it was not comparable with other waves. 
5 SHARE data collection has been funded primarily by the European Commission through FP5 
(QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-
2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: No. 211909, 
SHARE-LEAP: No. 227822, SHARE M4: No. 261982). Additional funding from the German 
Ministry of Education and Research, the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-
13S2, P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, 
IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064), and from various national funding sources is gratefully 
acknowledged (see www.share-project.org). 
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multiple imputation procedure has been used to tackle missing data (Rubin, 
2007). This technique allows predicting what the random missing values would 
have been using information from the whole dataset (waves 1, 2, 4 and 5). This 
technique requires two assumptions: (i) the data must be missing at random, 
which is clearly the case because observations for public home care are missing 
for all the individuals in wave 4, and (ii) the reasons for the missing data must 
be captured by other variables that do not have missing values. As the missing 
variable is binary, a logistic imputation method has been chosen, and the 
following explanatory variables have been introduced: age, gender, being 
married, having co-resident children, pathologies (stroke, mental illness, 
Parkinsonism, hip fracture), and a left-wing regional government. To test the 
sensitivity of our results, we have selected five different random seed values, 
and added five different imputations to our main dataset. The results in these 
alternative cases were very similar to the original estimations. 
Long-term care measures. SAAD provided three types of benefits that 
we classify by defining three binary variables: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖    is a binary variable that 
takes the value 1 if the beneficiary receives cash benefits, and zero otherwise; 
𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖    is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the beneficiary receives public 
home care benefit, and zero otherwise; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable that takes the 
value 1 if the beneficiary receives any public LTC benefit. Cash benefits and 
in-kind benefits are mutually exclusive. Therefore, nobody can receive both 
types of benefits at the same time.  
Hospitalisations. Our data contain records on whether the survey 
respondent has spent a night in hospital over the past twelve months (including 
medical, surgical, psychiatric or any other specialized wards), and the total 
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number of hospital overnights over the past twelve months. We use this 
information to define three dependent variables: 
a) Hospitalisation (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖) is a variable that takes the value 0 if the individual has 
not spent any nights in hospital over the past twelve months, and is equal to 
1  if they have. 
 
b) Hospitalisation length of stay (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) is a count variable taking the value 0 
if the individual has not spent a single night in hospital over the past twelve 
months, and a positive value equal to the number of nights they have spent 
in a hospital over the past year.  
 
c) Number of Hospitalisations (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖) is a count variable taking the value 0 if 
the individual has not been admitted to hospital over the past twelve 
months, and a positive value equal to the number of times they have been 
admitted over the past year. Given that Spain’s LTC reform was first 
introduced in 2007, and hospitalisation records cover the twelve months 
prior to the survey, some hospitalisations recorded in 2007 may actually 
have occurred in 2006. To capture the reform’s true effect on 
hospitalisations, we will assume that the pre-reform period covers waves 1 
and 2 (2004, 2006, 2007), and the post-reform period covers waves 4 and 5 
(2011 and 2013).  
 
Figure 1 examines the external margin, that is, the percentage of hospitalised 
individuals by type of long term care service the individual got support for. 
Importantly, after 2007 there is a drop in both those beneficiaries of caregiving 
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allowances and home care, but not among those who do not receive any 
benefits. In 2013, possibly due to the effect of the austerity cuts in 2012, some 
of these benefits were reversed. However, these are trends that need to control 
for a number of other misleading effects, and we do so in our econometric 
analysis below.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the density function for the number of hospitalisations 
by receipts of LTC benefit and the time of the survey. It is noticeable that 
SAAD beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries tend to move in opposite directions. 
We find that between 2004-07 and 2011 there are higher concentrations of 
lower numbers of hospital overnights for beneficiaries, as opposed to a slight 
shift to the right for non-beneficiaries. In contrast, between 2011 and 2013, the 
density functions for both groups partially reverse the displacements observed 
in the previous sub-period (e.g., a higher concentration of a lower number of 
hospital overnights for non-beneficiaries, but an increase for beneficiaries).  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Table A2 in the Appendix reports the descriptive statistics for the 
number of hospital overnights. In nearly all the cases, the standard deviation 
exceeds the mean, which is a clear symptom of overdispersion. Between waves 
1&2 and wave 4, the total number of hospital overnights has decreased for 
those receiving cash benefits (from 11.35 to 8.75) or home care (from 15.36 to 
11.54). However, between the last two waves, previous hospital intensity 
reductions have been partially wiped out, especially for those receiving cash 
benefits (from 8.17 in W4 to 12.09 in W5). 
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Explanatory variables. The SHARE questionnaire provides 
information on the respondents’ main socio-demographic characteristics. The 
choice of explanatory variables has been based on previous evidence, and 
includes age, gender, level of education, marital status, self-reported health 
status, Katz’s index6, net income (€2011), and net wealth (€2011). A detailed 
tabulation of descriptive statistics for individual explanatory variables is 
reported in Table A3. The beneficiaries of public home care are on average 10 
years older than cash benefit receivers. They also record a higher concentration 
of women, widowed, and more dependent individuals. Regardless of 
beneficiary status, all the groups have suffered a sharp decrease in real net 
income and real net wealth between both sub-periods.  
Additionally, a set of regional variables is included for region-specific 
unobservables at the time of the survey (see Table A4). First, given that 
hospital utilisation might be explained by resource constraints and demand 
pressures in the health sector rather than LTC subsidisation, we control for 
public health expenditure per capita (€2011) and degree of satisfaction with the 
public healthcare received. We find that real public health expenditure and the 
degree of satisfaction with the public healthcare system peaked in 2011. 
Second, the number of resources and the quality of care received at hospitals is 
approximated by the infection rate at hospitals and the number of public 
hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. We observe an increase in the infection 
rate at hospitals in the last two waves, and a progressive rise in the number of 
hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in publicly owned hospitals during the 
period. 
                                                          
6 Katz’s index is not directly provided by SHARE, but has been obtained using data on disabilities for 
ADLs, following Katz (1983). 
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Third, as described in Table 1, some regions implemented health and 
social care coordination plans in the period. Hence, we define a binary variable 
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) that takes the value 1 if that coordination programme is in place in the 
region at the time of the survey. Finally, Spain went through a recession during 
at least some of our data waves, which led to employment shocks, as well as a 
shock to the economy as a whole. We control for both effects.  
5. Empirical Strategy  
 
 
Difference-in-differences. Given the type of programme evaluation analysis 
we seek to perform, we compare individuals that qualified for a LTC subsidy 
(and its different forms), who have similar characteristics to those that did not 
qualify after the reform. The corresponding regression model to be estimated 
contains three different dependent variables, namely, the probability of a 
hospitalisation (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), the length of stay, (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and the number of 
hospitalisations (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) that individual i living in region c has undergone over 
the past twelve months. It may be expressed as the following difference-in-
differences regression for the probability of hospitalisation: 
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼2 + 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼3 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 ++𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (1) 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the individual 
receives public LTC benefits, and zero otherwise, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  is a vector of 
individual sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, level 
of education, degree of dependency approximated by the Katz’s Index, self-
reported health status, real income, and real wealth). 
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𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes the characteristics of the regional healthcare sector 
(public health expenditure per capita in real terms, number of public hospital 
beds per 1,000 inhabitants, infection rate at hospitals, and satisfaction with the 
public healthcare system); 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖    denote regional and temporal dummy 
variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random error term that also captures individual 
unobserved characteristics. The estimation of this model faces two important 
issues, namely, model specification and the existence of potentially 
endogenous variables.  
Model Specification. Given that we measure the internal and external margin 
of hospitalisations and the length of stay with count data, we need to account 
for the fact that the dependent variable does not have negative values. 
Furthermore, a corner solution (zero hospitalisations) may be an optimal 
solution if an individual does need to be admitted. Hence, a linear model might 
have misspecified the count data generating process, and may lead to negative 
or non-integer predictions (King, 1988). The number of hospital overnights (or 
number of hospitalisations) is similar to the Poisson process because the 
probability of occurrence decreases as their frequency increases. Nevertheless, 
a Poisson specification might be too restrictive if the data variance exceeds the 
mean (overdispersion). 
A common alternative to the Poisson model is the negative binomial 
model. Although the negative binomial solves the problem of overdispersion, 
neither of them provides a suitable fit if there is a large percentage of zero 
observations in the dataset. The models normally used in the empirical 
literature are the zero-inflated and double-hurdle ones. The zero-inflated model 
is sensitive to the fact that zeros may arise in two circumstances, namely, either 
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as a consequence of a strategic decision, or due to incidental reasons 
(Winkelmann, 2008).  Some individuals may report zero hospitalisations 
because they have not suffered a serious enough health shock that requires 
admission. These individuals may be referred to as ‘strategic non-hospitalised’. 
On the other hand, an individual who does require surgery or inpatient care and 
does not receive it would qualify as an ‘incidental zero observation’7.  
One alternative is the double-hurdle model, also referred to as the two-
part model. The double-hurdle model postulates that the zeros are only the 
result of strategic decisions, hence all zero observations are thus generated by a 
mechanism separate from that of non-zeros (Mullahy, 1986; Gurmu, 1998). 
The first hurdle determines whether the count variable is zero or has a positive 
realization i.e., if the individual has been hospitalised at least once in the past 
12 months). A positive value indicates that the first hurdle is met, and in this 
case the exact number of hospitalisation days (hospital intensity) is modelled 
using a truncated distribution. Both stages are independent, and the first hurdle 
is usually modelled with a logistic distribution, and the second hurdle as a zero-
truncated negative binomial or Poisson (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).  
 Endogeneity. Estimation by the maximum likelihood of equation (1) 
yields consistent and efficient estimations if 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  are exogenous. 
However, if unobserved determinants of 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are correlated with 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the 
estimated coefficients will be biased. Additionally, a core assumption of the 
difference-in-differences model is that the time trend is common to both 
                                                          
7 Given the characteristics of the Spanish health system, this situation seems in principle highly 
improbable. SHARE only provides information on unmet hospitalisation needs for wave 1: 0.29% 
(0.33%) of respondents reported not having received surgery or hospital treatment because they could not 
afford it (it was not available). 
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groups, whereby treatment and control individuals would behave in a parallel 
manner without the LTC reform, after controlling for observables.  
One of the threats of the difference-in-differences strategy is that we do 
not account for the potential endogeneity in the implementation of the reform. 
For example, if we consider the situation of individuals with poor health, they 
will certainly have a higher than average probability of being hospitalised, and 
a higher than average probability of receiving LTC benefits. Furthermore, we 
assume that the SAAD has been implemented at a different pace in each 
region, and that some regions have a significantly higher propensity to award 
economic benefits, whereas others are more prone to award in-kind benefits. 
As a result, the error term of (1) could be correlated with unobservable 
variables that affect the implementation of the SAAD. Hence, OLS estimation 
of (1) would produce inconsistent parameter estimates.  
Indeed we have two potential endogenous variables: 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. We propose using a control function (CF) approach to 
consider the potential endogeneity of SAAD and SAAD x POST. This 
technique, suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and Blundell and Powell (2003), is 
useful for estimating non-linear models. In a first stage, we perform a linear 
regression of the endogenous variables on all exogenous variables and 
instruments, and obtain the residuals. In a second stage, we use the residuals as 
additional control variables in the main regression. We use bootstrapping to 
obtain valid standard errors.  
We have introduced six instruments in these regressions. The first one 
is the percentage of the vote for the socialist party in the last general elections 
(𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), as the socialist party’s electoral mandate included the development and 
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implementation of a new LTC Act8 (see Table A5). Specifically, given that the 
reform was the ‘star social programme’ of a newly elected socialist 
government, and that the regions were co-financing and implementing the 
reform, we use regional political information to instrument reform 
implementation. Hence, the instrument is both theoretically relevant and 
empirically significant, and there is no reason to believe it impacts on the 
dependent variable in any other way. The second instrument is the interaction 
between the percentage of the vote for the socialist party and the post-reform 
period (𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃). We also include the coverage index of public home care 
in 2002 and 2000, before the onset of the SAAD, to capture the effect of 
regional differences in the provision of formal care (see Table A6). The fifth 
instrument is the proportion of women at home, which can be interpreted as a 
measure of the propensity to receive informal care. Finally, we have included 
the place of residence, defining a binary variable if the individual lives in the 
countryside, and zero otherwise. This variable controls for the expected lack of 
social services in rural areas compared to cities. 
The results of the first-stage regressions confirm the validity of our 
instruments. Regions with higher socialist support have a lower propensity to 
award cash benefits, but a significant and positive association with home care 
benefits (Table A7). The coverage index of public home care in 2000 and 2002 
leads to the same results: negative for cash benefits, but positive for home care. 
By contrast, a higher fraction of women at home or living in a rural area is 
associated with a higher probability of cash benefits, but a lower one for home 
care benefits. 
                                                          
8 Hence, regions  run by the socialist party would be expected to speed up the implementation of the 
reform, as some previous research has documented (Costa-Font, 2010). 
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The Choice of Model. A statistical exploration of the data has led us to 
consider a logit plus zero-truncated Poisson (double-hurdle) model to solve the 
overdispersion problem mentioned earlier9. The results (available upon 
request) point to the same conclusions for the three types of benefits. First, the 
significance of the overdispersion parameter (alpha) and the comparison of the 
AIC and BIC statistics for the Poisson and negative binomial models indicate 
that the negative binomial model fits the data better. Second, the likelihood 
ratio test between the Poisson and the hurdle Poisson indicates the suitability of 
a double-hurdle model. Third, the likelihood ratio test between the negative 
binomial and the hurdle negative binomial rejects the former. Finally, a 
comparison between both hurdle models rejects the hurdle binomial.  
Given the potential endogeneity of SAAD, we use the control function (CF) 
approach in both hurdles. For the first hurdle, Petrin and Train (2010) propose 
the CF approach as a more flexible method than others, such as Bayesian 
analysis (Yang et al., 2008) or simulated maximum likelihood (Gupta and Park, 
2009), because it does not impose strict distributional assumptions for the 
identification of parameters. For the second hurdle -the zero-truncated 
regression- we perform the CF approach as suggested by Wooldridge (1997) 
for count data models. Chen (2010) suggests that the identification of 
parameters in truncated models with endogeneity improves in the presence of 
continuous regressors. The presence of continuous variables as explanatory 
                                                          
9 The truncated Poisson allows us to solver the overdispersion problem of the simple Poisson model. 
Considering that 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  includes all regressors: 
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ Ω + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Ω + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶[𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω] = = 𝐸𝐸[𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω] + 𝐸𝐸[𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω]�𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′Ω − 𝐸𝐸[𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω]�  
𝐸𝐸[𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω] = exp (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ Ω)1 + exp (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ Ω) ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′Ω1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ Ω 
Depending on 𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′Ω and 𝐸𝐸[𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω], the mean may be bigger or smaller than the variance, and 
therefore, it can accommodate overdispersion and underdispersion situations.  
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covariates (income, wealth, and variables related to public healthcare) and 
continuous instruments (percentage of votes for  the socialist party, coverage 
index of public home care, percentage of women at home) supports the validity 
of our results. Finally, in the double-hurdle model we bootstrap the standard 
errors in both hurdles. 
6. Results 
 
The effect of the reform on hospitalisations . Consistently with expectation we 
find evidence of a reduction of hospitalisations for those who benefit from the 
reform after the reform. Table 2 reports the results for the key coefficients of the 
hurdle Poisson model for hospitalisation, number of hospitalisations and the 
length of stay as a results of the introduction of the SAAD, both for the case of 
cash benefits and also for the case of home help (all the other coefficients are 
presented for the baseline case in Table A8). Specifically, panel A reports the 
baseline case for these effects; panel B presents the coordination case 
emphasising the effects for those regions that have implemented coordination 
between healthcare and social care, and finally, panel C presents the analysis of 
the effect of budgetary cuts implemented in the SAAD in 2013. The first-stage 
residuals are not significant in the first hurdle (logit), but they are in the second 
one (truncated Poisson). The Hausman test rejects the endogeneity of SAAD and 
SAAD x POST in the first hurdle, but accepts it for the second one. However, 
for statistical coherency we keep and present the Instrumental Variables  
specification for both hurdles. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
24 
 
Baseline results. Panel A in Table 2 presents the model’s baseline results, with 
the treatment variable after the reform captured by the interaction SAAD*POST. 
Our results indicate that, as expected, the reform did indeed reduce the number 
of hospitalisations, the probability of hospitalisation and the length of stay. 
However, the effect size is different for cash benefits and home help. Home help 
had a bigger impact on length of stay, whilst cash benefit did so on the number 
of hospitalisations. Our effect sizes indicate that the length of stay for cash 
beneficiaries (home care beneficiaries) is 0.79 (0.70) times shorter than that of 
similar beneficiaries in the pre-reform period. The beneficiaries of cash benefits 
record an increase in the number of hospitalisations (1.13 times more than non-
beneficiaries). However, after the reform, their number of hospitalisations and 
average length of stay is 0.80 times lower compared to beneficiaries in the pre-
reform period.  
For home care beneficiaries, we observe that the probability of hospitalisation 
increases by 5.2 pp, and length of stay is 1.26 times that of non-home care 
beneficiaries. The interaction term (SAADxPOST) indicates that the number of 
hospitalisations (length of stay) in the post-reform period is 0.90 (0.69) times 
that of a home care beneficiary in the pre-reform period.  
Therefore, cash beneficiaries have benefited more in terms of the reduction in 
the number of hospitalisations, but home care beneficiaries have seen a bigger 
decrease in the average length of stay. 
When we examine the effect of all the other controls (see Table A8 in the 
Appendix), we find that the number of public beds per 100,000 inhabitants does 
not affect either the probability of hospitalisation or hospital intensity. Apart 
from this, a higher infection rate and higher satisfaction with the public 
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healthcare system are negatively correlated with hospital intensity. In contrast, 
higher public healthcare expenditure is positively correlated with hospital 
intensity.  
The role of coordination. Panel B in Table 2 reports the combined effect of 
coordination and LTC on hospitalisations and length of stay. As in panel A, in 
the post-reform period, we report the probability of hospitalization, number of 
hospital stays and length of stay of long-term care beneficiaries which have 
declined compared to the pre-reform period. The interaction term SAAD x 
Coordination indicates that: (i) the number of hospital stays for cash 
beneficiaries in coordinated regions is 1.33 times higher than similar 
beneficiaries in non-coordinated regions, (ii) the length of stay of home care 
beneficiaries in coordinated regions was 1.42 times that of similar beneficiaries 
in non-coordinated regions.  
However, the triple interaction SAAD x Coord xPOST offers a different picture. 
First, the probability of hospitalisation falls by 11.6 pp. among those who are 
entitled to receive cash benefits, and by 18.5 pp for home care in regions with 
coordination programmes between healthcare and LTC services. However, we 
do not find a significant effect of cash subsidy on length of stay, suggesting that 
coordination effects only reduce the length of stay require among those who are 
receive a home help subsidy. Therefore, it seems that coordination programs 
were breeding ground for the implementation of the reform (SAAD), insofar as 
they deliver a reduction of the number of hospitalizations and length of stay at 
hospital in the post-reform period.  
Overall, the length of stay for patients receiving home care in regions with 
coordination programmes after the reform has decreased by 0.66 
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hospitalisations/year compared to other patients receiving home care in a region 
without a coordination programme. Regarding the number of hospitalisations, 
they have been reduced by 0.86 (0.79) for cash beneficiaries (home care 
beneficiaries) in coordinated regions after the reform, as compared to non-
coordinated regions. As in the baseline case, the residuals corresponding to the 
first-stage regression for the four endogenous variables are significant in the 
second hurdle, but not in the first one.  
The effect of the 2012/2013 budgetary cuts. Finally, panel C in Table 2 presents 
the effects of the austerity cuts introduced between 2012 and 2013. The 
interaction term SAAD x POST (2011&2013) indicates that the length of stay 
for receivers of cash benefits (home care) is 0.86 (0.87) times that of similar 
beneficiaries in the pre-reform period. Nevertheless, these reductions have been 
partially curtailed by opposite sign effects observed for SAAD x YEAR (2013), 
affecting both the length of stay and the number of hospitalisations, but not the 
probability of hospitalisation consistent with a bed-blocking effect. In fact, we 
find that the expected length of stay of receivers of cash benefits (home care) in 
2013 is 1.29 (1.48) days longer than that of similar beneficiaries before that year. 
Finally, we also find that budgetary cuts have a significant effect on the 
probability of hospitalisation, particularly for those who have been hospitalised 
at least once during the last year, where we observe a significant increase in the 
number of hospitalisations (1.16 hospitalisations/year for cash beneficiaries; 
1.40 hospitalisations/year for home care beneficiaries). 
Impact on hospitalisation cost  
As a way of synthesising our estimates, we have calculated the economic impact 
of the SAAD over hospital costs. To that end, we have based our estimates of the 
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average length and average costs of hospitalisation by region and year on official 
data from the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Immigration. Specifically, 
we have first computed the average cost per day as the ratio between total 
hospitalisation cost and average length of stay. Secondly, using calibrated 
weights provided by SHARE for each wave, we have obtained the population 
estimate of the number of cash beneficiaries and home care beneficiaries. 
Thirdly, we have applied the estimated coefficients to average length data to 
obtain the estimated hospital intensity (in days). Finally, we have multiplied the 
estimated hospital intensity by the number of beneficiaries and the average costs 
per day. The results are shown in Table 12.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
For a better understanding of the magnitude of the results, we have compared the 
estimated increase or decrease in hospital costs with the official data for hospital 
costs in Table 3. For the country as a whole, the implementation of the SAAD 
has decreased hospital costs by 11%, with 5% from a reduction in 
hospitalizations and 6% from a reduction in the length of stay. Moreover, in the 
subset of regions with specific coordination programmes between healthcare and 
social services, the SAAD has implied a reduction in hospital costs of 5.15%: 
with 2.7% from a reduction in the number of hospitalizations and 2.45% from a 
reduction in the length of stay. Finally, as expected, the 2012 austerity cuts in the 
LTC subsidy increased re-admissions by 5.7%, which is slightly more than the 
savings from coordination plans. 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper has drawn on quasi-experimental evidence (the introduction of the 
Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care of Dependent People, or SAAD in 
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Spanish) to examine the effect of the universalisation of the public LTC subsidy 
on hospitalisation (both the internal and external margin) and length of stay in 
Spain. We find suggestive evidence of a reduction in hospitalisations and length 
of stay even after controlling for the endogeneity of the reform’s 
implementation. We find that the effect on the number of hospitalisations is 
stronger among individuals receiving cash benefits, whilst the effect on the 
length of stay is stronger among those receiving home help. However, the results 
were heterogeneous to the implementation of regional health and social care 
coordination plans, which have been enacted after the expansion of the funding 
of home help. Consistently,  our results suggest that part of the savings from 
LTC subsidies is lost by the reduction in the LTC subsidy in 2012 on the internal  
margin, hence a reduction of the subsidy does indeed increase hospital length of 
stay and the number of hospitalisations. Overall, we estimate that the 
implementation of the reform has decreased hospital costs by 11%.  
These results suggest that an expansion of LTC funding may help to reduce 
otherwise pre-existing inefficiencies in the use of hospital care, and specifically 
the number of hospitalisations and the length of stay. Furthermore, it suggests 
that if the coordination of health and social care is to give rise to efficiency 
savings, funding responsibilities should be adequate and allocated at the same 
level of government as healthcare10.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Density function of hospital length of stay by exposure to the 2007 reform 
and 2012 austerity cuts 
 
Note: Density function for the number of hospital overnights distinguishing between beneficiaries of LTC 
benefits and non-beneficiaries (not receiving either in-kind or cash benefits). Straight lines refer to pre-
reform hospitalisation for both those affected (red) and those not affected (black) by the reform. Bold 
dotted lines refer to the post-2007 reform, and light dotted lines refer to those affected by the 2012 
reform. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Percentage of hospitalisations (extensive margin) by type of subsidy 
2004-2013. 
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Note:  This figure plots the percentage of hospitalised population by three types of individuals, namely, 
those who do not benefit from the reform, those who receive economic benefits (caregiving allowance), 
and those who receive a subsidised home care service.  
 
 
Figure 3. Density function of number of hospitalisations (intensive margin) by 
exposure to the 2007 reform and 2012 austerity cuts 
 
 
Note: Density function for the number of hospital stays distinguishing between beneficiaries of LTC 
benefits and non-beneficiaries (not receiving either in-kind or cash benefits). Straight lines refer to pre-
reform hospitalisation for both those affected (red) and those not affected (black) by the reform. Bold 
dotted lines refer to the post-2007 reform, and light dotted lines refer to those affected by the 2012 
reform. 
 
Table 1. Coordination between healthcare and long-term care services 
Region of Spain Name of the Programme or Agency Period 
Castilla y León Plan de Atención Sociosanitario   Decree 59/2003, of 23 
January 
Coord=1 for all waves 
Castilla La Mancha Consejería de Salud y Bienestar Social   Decree 139/2008, of 9 
September 
Coord=1 for waves 4 and 5 
Catalonia Plan Director Sociosanitario. Programa 
Vida als Anys. 
Plan de Atención Sociosanitario 2000 
Plan Director Sociosanitario 2006 
 Decree 242/1999, of 31 
August 
Coord=1 for all waves 
Community of 
Valencia 
Programa Especial de la Atención Sanitaria 
a pacientes ancianos, a pacientes con 
enfermedades de larga evolución y a 
pacientes en situación terminal (PALET), 
1995.  
Coord=1 for all waves 
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Extremadura Consejería de Sanidad y Dependencia Law 1/2008, of 22 May 
Coord=1 for waves 4 and 5 
Navarre Plan Foral de Atención Sociosanitaria.  Agreement of the Government 
of Navarre of 27 June 2000 
Coord=1 for all waves 
Basque Country Consejo Vasco de Atención Sociosanitaria  Coord=1 for wave 5 
Source: Jiménez-Martín et al. (2011).  
 
Table 2. Hurdle Poisson for number (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖) and length of stay of hospitalisation (𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖). Logit for the first hurdle; zero 
truncated Poisson for the second hurdle). Marginal effects are shown for the first hurdle; estimated coefficients are shown 
for the second hurdle. Bootstrap with 100 repetitions. The first hurdle (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖) coincides for both hurdle Poisson models.   
 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
A. Baseline          
SAAD 0.078*** 0.126** -0.148*** 0.052*** 0.019 0.237*** 0.086*** 0.145*** -0.020 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
SAAD x POST -0.095*** -0.222** -0.234*** 0.014 -0.111** -0.362*** -0.052*** -0.339** -0.288*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) 
          
Resid. (SAAD) -1.009 24.160*** -17.517*** 0.712 -27.375*** -6.014*** -0.674 13.008** -0.978 
 (1.93) (4.34) (5.53) (0.71) (7.64) (2.03) (0.64) (6.61) (1.84) 
Resid. (SAAD x POST) -0.045 14.005*** 14.251*** 1.180 22.485*** 4.988 -0.561 10.093** 6.144*** 
 (0.79) (3.61) (2.26) (1.50) (5.77) (4.28) (0.41) (4.47) (1.21) 
F-test residuals 
(p-value) 
0.41 
(0.524) 
 63.20 
(0.000) 
56.18 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.890) 
 61.28 
(0.000) 
48.23 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.910) 
 60.85 
(0.000) 
47.25 
(0.000) 
Hausman test 19.374 295.630 217.196 2.791 278.968 591.267 1.999 225.063 534.215 
  (𝜒𝜒452 ; p-value) (0.999) (0.000) (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B. Coordination Plans    
SAAD 0.084*** 0.576** -0.181*** 0.053*** 0.032 0.212*** 0.094*** 0.530*** -0.134*** 
 (0.02) (0.25) (0.06) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) (0.03) 
SAAD x POST -0.077*** -0.149*** -0.200*** 0.016 -0.114** -0.316*** -0.061*** -0.257*** -0.158*** 
 (0.02) (0.27) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.04) 
Coordination 0.038 -0.043 0.027 0.038 0.021 -0.078 0.044 0.064 -0.063 
 (0.03) (0.36) (0.08) (0.03) (0.35) (0.08) (0.03) (0.34) (0.09) 
Coordination x POST -0.095*** 0.143 0.097 -0.089*** 0.009 0.122 -0.090*** 0.122 0.193** 
 (0.03) (0.33) (0.08) (0.03) (0.32) (0.08) (0.03) (0.31) (0.08) 
SAAD  x Coord -0.031 0.288*** 0.030 -0.019 0.395 0.355*** -0.061 0.501* 0.340*** 
 (0.04) (0.36) (0.12) (0.03) (0.26) (0.07) (0.03) (0.27) (0.07) 
SAAD x Coord x POST -0.116* -0.148*** 0.114 -0.185*** -0.231*** -0.405*** 0.077 -0.363*** -0.450*** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.18) (0.02) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) 
F-test for residuals 0.25 
(0.615) 
77.33 
(0.000) 
78.96 
(0.000) 
0.40 
(0.526) 
75.46 
(0.000) 
80.23 
(0.000) 
0.03 
(0.871) 
76.12 
(0.000) 
81.76 
(0.000) 
C. Effect of budgetary cuts          
SAAD 0.078*** -0.179 -0.149*** 0.052*** 0.014 0.238*** 0.086*** -0.064 -0.020 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) 
SAAD x POST(2011&2013) -0.104* -0.120 -0.145*** -0.028 -0.660 -0.138*** -0.087** -0.386 -0.140*** 
 (0.06) (0.70) (0.05) (0.07) (0.97) (0.21) (0.04) (0.57) (0.14) 
SAAD x POST(2013) -0.288 0.149** 0.252** 0.656 0.336*** 0.395** 1.030 0.465*** 0.309** 
 (2.61) (0.05) (0.60) (1.37) (0.07) (0.29) (1.33) (0.16) (0.48) 
F-test for residuals 0.59 
(0.443) 
87.15 
(0.000) 
80.91 
(0.000) 
0.06 
(0.802) 
84.87 
(0.000) 
87.23 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.953) 
83.16 
(0.000) 
82.65 
(0.000) 
N 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 
Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, self-reported health status, Katz’s index, real income, real 
wealth, per capita public healthcare expenditure, number of public hospital beds per 100,000 inhabitants, satisfaction with public 
healthcare system, infection rate at hospital, year and regional dummies are not shown. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 
5% level, * at 10% level. 
Baseline: F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(2,14726) for the logit model, F(2,1665) for the truncated Poisson. 
Coordination case: F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(4,14724) for the logit model, F(4,1663) for the truncated Poisson. 
Effect of budgetary cuts: F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(3,14725) for the logit model, F(3,1664) for the truncated 
Poisson. 
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Table 3. Estimation of the effect of the SAAD over hospital costs (Figures in euros) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reduction/increase in hospital costs due to 
 
Hospital costs* 
2007 
(1)+(2) w/r 
to hospital 
costs 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
(1) 
𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
(2) 
Total 
(1)+(2) 
  
Number of hospitalisations     
Base case -609,147,824 -120,235,688 -729,383,512 14,727,559,994 -4.95 
Coordination -160,527,318 -34,122,441 -194,649,758 7,063,627,888 -2.76 
SAAD Effect 
2013 239,468,171 290,442,486 529,910,657 
14,727,559,994 
3.60 
Hospital 
length of stay 
  
 
  
Base case -600,824,472 -314,387,318 -915,211,790 14,727,559,994 -6.21 
Coordination No signif, -112,975,580 -173,439,479 7,063,627,888 -2.46 
SAAD Effect 
2013 233,564,656 71,077,192 304,641,847 
14,727,559,994 
2.07 
Total effect     
Base case -1,209,972,296 -434,623,006 -1,644,595,302 14,727,559,994 -11.17 
Coordination -160,527,318 -147,098,021 -368,089,237 7,063,627,888 -5.21 
SAAD Effect 
2013 473,032,827 361,519,678 834,552,504 
14,727,559,994 
5.67 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *Hospital Notes: costs  data refer to Spain for the base case. For the other cases, hospital costs are computed taking into 
account the sum of hospital costs of the affected regions.  
Data on hospital costs from the Ministry of Health, Social Issues and Immigration. 
http://pestadistico.inteligenciadegestion.msssi.es/publicoSNS/comun/DefaultPublico.aspx 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Number of days elapsed between application to the SAAD and determination of dependency level  
 # days elapsed between application to the 
SAAD and determination of dependency level 
 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Andalusia 162 167 
Aragón 160 135 
Asturias 269 361 
Balearic Isles 223 201 
Canary Islands 322 133 
Cantabria 146 120 
Community of León 158 100 
Community of La 
Mancha 250 156 
Catalonia 174 115 
Community of 
Valencia 265 219 
Extremadura 250 178 
Galicia 270 174 
Madrid 337 227 
Murcia 183 - 
Navarre 214 - 
Basque Country 146 101 
La Rioja 91 88 
Ceuta Melilla 83 - 
Spain 205 155 
Auditor’s report on economic-financial management and the application of Law 39/2006, of 14 December, on the Promotion of 
Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent People. No. 977 
Auditor’s report on the management and control measures adopted by the Autonomous Communities for the due application of Law 
39/2006, of 14 December, on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent People. No. 1035 
http://www.tcu.es/tribunal-de-cuentas/es/ 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for total number of hospitalisations and length of stay during the last year 
 Wave 1 & 2 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Hospital length of stay    
Non-beneficiaries 10.23 12.38 10.33 
 (16.80) (14.52) (18.37) 
 
 
 
 
Beneficiaries SAAD benefit    
Cash benefit (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 11.35 8.75 12.09 
 (19.98) (7.07) (13.03) 
Home care (𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 15.36 11.54 11.78 
 (24.75) (13.19) (14.81) 
Total ( 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 15.33 10.75 11.82 
 (24.62) (11.81) (14.49) 
    
  Number of hospitalisations    
Non-beneficiaries 1.70 1.80 1.60 
 (1.64) (1.72) (1.34) 
Beneficiaries SAAD benefit    
Cash benefit (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 2.04 1.62 2.13 
 (1.88) (1.56) (1.72) 
Home care (𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 1.86 1.75 1.92 
 (1.67) (1.45) (1.12) 
Total ( 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 2.01 1.71 2.01 
 (1.49) (1.53) (1.82) 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SHARE, several years. 
Total number of individuals hospitalised: 1,389 for non-beneficiaries, 185 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 170 for 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 355 for 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
Total number of observations: 13,512 for non-beneficiaries, 751 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 503 for 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 1,256 for 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 No SAAD benefit 
Male 51.93 33.28 44.02 44.88 
Age 65.13 77.05 70.30 67.09 
 (10.03) (10.83) (12.01) (11.05) 
Marital status     
Married/cohabiting 72.97 58.54 66.51 77.72 
Separated/divorced 4.39 2.09 3.35 2.86 
Single 13.58 7.49 10.77 5.37 
Widowed 7.59 31.01 18.10 12.95 
Missing marital status 1.46 0.87 1.28 1.10 
Education     
No schooling  25.97 31.71 28.31 18.62 
Elementary 52.46 42.16 48.72 53.97 
High School 6.79 5.75 6.22 9.31 
College 14.78 20.38 16.75 18.10 
Self-reported health     
Excellent 0.80 0.35 0.64 3.36 
Good 3.33 2.26 2.87 13.89 
Fair 17.44 13.59 16.03 35.82 
Poor 78.43 83.80 80.46 46.93 
Dependency degree     
Katz0 69.77 49.83 62.04 89.25 
Katz1 13.32 21.60 16.91 6.26 
Katz2 7.46 11.15 9.09 2.05 
Katz3 9.45 17.42 11.96 2.44 
Real wealth (€2011) 219,620 267,752 243,281 299,106 
 (592,726) (979,304) (799,507) (740,467) 
Real income (€2011) 19,549 16,519 18,399.2 21,792 
 (19,325) (18,262) (19,221) (26,805) 
N 751 503 1,256 13,512 
Standard deviation between brackets. 
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Table A4. Regional variables 
 2004 2006 2007 2011 2013 
Infection rate at hospital c 1.16 1.19 1.18 1.26 1.32 
Number of  public hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants c 2.22 2.15 2.30 2.42 2.53 
Degree of satisfaction with public healthcare c 
 (1: minimum satisfaction; 10: maximum satisfaction) 6.25 5.62 6.36 6.57 6.31 
Public health expenditure per capita (€2011) c 1,152 1,333 1,390 1,392 1,248 
a Regional Accounts (National Institute of Statistics) 
b Active Population Survey (National Institute of Statistics) 
c Indicators of the National Health System (Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality) 
 
Table A5. Voting percentages to the socialist party in regional elections. 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 5 
 2004 2006 2007 2011 2013 
Andalusia 51.07 51.07 51.07 48.41 39.52 
Aragón 37.91 37.91 41.03 41.03 21.41 
Asturias 40.30 40.30 42.04 42.04 26.45 
Balearic Isles 24.60 24.60 31.75 31.75 18.94 
Canary Islands  25.50 25.50 34.72 34.72 19.96 
Cantabria 29.91 29.91 24.33 24.33 14.01 
Community of León 36.74 36.74 37.49 37.49 37.77 
Community of La 
Mancha 57.81 57.81 51.92 51.92 36.11 
Catalonia 31.16 31.16 27.38 18.32 14.43 
Community of 
Valencia 46.92 46.92 34.49 34.49 20.30 
Extremadura 51.62 51.62 52.90 52.90 41.50 
Galicia 22.20 33.64 33.64 31.02 20.61 
Madrid 33.46 33.46 33.47 33.47 25.44 
Murcia 34.03 34.03 31.81 31.81 23.96 
Navarre 21.14 21.14 22.40 22.40 13.43 
Basque Country 17.90 22.68 22.68 30.70 19.14 
La Rioja 38.29 38.29 40.47 40.47 26.70 
Ceuta 8.76 8.76 8.71 8.71 11.70 
Melilla 11.92 11.92 18.49 18.49 8.44 
Source: author’s own work using http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/autonomicas/ 
Aragón, Asturias, Balearic Isles, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castilla León, Castilla La Mancha, Community of Valencia, 
Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, La Rioja, Ceuta and Melilla: 
• Results from regional elections May 25th 2003 have been applied to waves 1 and 2. 
• Results from regional elections May 27th 2007 have been applied to wave 4. 
• Results from regional elections May 22nd 2011 have been applied to wave 5. 
Andalusia: 
• Results from regional elections March 14th 2004 have been applied to waves 1 and 2. 
• Results from regional elections March 9th 2008 have been applied to wave 4. 
• Results from regional election March 25th 2012 have been applied to wave 5.  
Catalonia 
• Results from regional elections November 16th 2003 have been applied to wave 1 and wave 2 (only 2006). 
• Results from regional elections November 1st 2006 have been applied to wave 2 (only 2007). 
• Results from regional elections November 28th 2010 have been applied to wave 1 
• Results from regional elections November 25th 2012 have been applied to wave 5. 
Basque Country 
• Results from May 13th 2001 have been applied to wave 1.  
• Results from regional elections April 17th 2005 have been applied to wave 2. 
• Results from regional elections March 1st 2009 have been applied to wave 4. 
• Results from regional elections October 21st 2012 have been applied to wave 5. 
Galicia 
• Results from October 21st 2001 have been applied to wave 1.  
• Results from regional elections June 19th 2005 have been applied to wave 2. 
• Results from regional elections March 1st 2009 have been applied to wave 4. 
• Results from regional elections October 21st 2012 have been applied to wave 5  
41 
 
Table A6. Coverage index of public home care 
 2000 2002 
Andalusia 1.79 2.04 
Aragón 2.52 2.44 
Asturias 1.51 1.79 
Balearic Isles 2.28 2.78 
Canary Islands 1.9 1.88 
Cantabria 1.51 1.55 
Community of León 2.54 2.48 
Community of La 
Mancha 2.13 2.55 
Catalonia 1.23 1.3 
Community of 
Valencia 0.78 2.16 
Extremadura 4.69 4.86 
Galicia 1.16 1.35 
Madrid 1.98 1.89 
Murcia 1.44 1.60 
Navarre 3.33 3.02 
Basque Country 2.3 2.85 
Rioja 2.76 2.84 
Ceuta 2.79 1.76 
Melilla 1.82 2.07 
Coverage index: ratio of number of home care beneficiaries divided by 
population aged 65 and over and multiplied by 100. 
Source: “Las personas mayores en España” (IMSERSO, 2000, 2002) 
Table A7. First-stage regression 
 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶*POST 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶*POST 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶*POST 
Socialist support (%) -0.045*** -0.057*** 0.088** 0.097*** 0.037* 0.038** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Socialist support (%)*POST -0.028* -0.047*** 0.128** 0.084** 0.095*** 0.040*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Home Care (2000) -0.016** -0.006* 0.025* 0.031** 0.008 0.020** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Home Care (2002) -0.035** -0.044** 0.051* 0.072*** 0.018** 0.028** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fraction women at home 0.044** 0.046*** -0.023* -0.018* -0.019* -0.026* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rural area 0.022** 0.021** -0.016* -0.014* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
F-test instrumental variables 234.56 154.07 160.41 150.46 149.95 139.80 
F(6,14722) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 14,766 
Estimated coefficients for age, gender, marital status, level of education, self-reported health status, Katz’s index, real income, real 
wealth, year and regional dummies are not shown. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. 
Table A8. Hurdle Poisson (logit for the first hurdle; zero-truncated Poisson for the second hurdle). Base case. Marginal 
effects are shown for the first hurdle; estimated coefficients are shown for the second hurdle. Bootstrap with 100 repetitions. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
Male 0.056 1.341*** 0.321*** 0.050*** 0.454*** 0.035 0.045*** 0.506*** 0.025 
 (0.04) (0.40) (0.11) (0.02) (0.16) (0.04) (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) 
Age -0.001 -0.092*** -0.020** -0.002 -0.031 0.009 0.001*** -0.004 0.002** 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/cohabiting -0.006 0.082 0.282*** -0.006 -0.242** 0.151*** -0.015 -0.303*** 0.194*** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) 
Separated/divorced -0.001 0.292 0.017 -0.034 -0.509 -0.052 0.006 -0.089 -0.169* 
 (0.03) (0.32) (0.09) (0.03) (0.33) (0.09) (0.03) (0.30) (0.09) 
Single 0.059 2.678** 0.861*** -0.013 -0.293* 0.092** 0.049 0.547 -0.008 
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 (0.11) (1.14) (0.31) (0.02) (0.17) (0.05) (0.05) (0.54) (0.15) 
Missing marital status -0.083 -2.491** -0.283 -0.048 -0.377 0.422* -0.067 -0.837 0.383* 
 (0.10) (1.25) (0.31) (0.06) (0.96) (0.22) (0.07) (0.99) (0.23) 
No schooling -0.022** 0.141 0.111*** -0.018* 0.160 0.098*** -0.021* 0.148 0.115*** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) 
Elementary education -0.027 -0.528** -0.111* -0.006 0.081 0.047 -0.026** -0.150 0.070* 
 (0.02) (0.22) (0.06) (0.01) (0.15) (0.04) (0.01) (0.13) (0.04) 
Secondary education -0.038 -1.567*** -0.424*** -0.019 -0.364* -0.067 -0.029 -0.581** -0.033 
 (0.05) (0.51) (0.14) (0.02) (0.20) (0.05) (0.02) (0.24) (0.07) 
Health status: excellent -0.147*** -1.176*** -1.094*** -0.171*** -1.192*** -1.057*** -0.144*** -1.159*** -1.093*** 
 (0.03) (0.33) (0.16) (0.03) (0.33) (0.16) (0.03) (0.33) (0.16) 
Health status: good -0.151*** -2.001** -0.843*** -0.157*** -2.029** -0.827*** -0.148*** -2.023** -0.854*** 
 (0.01) (0.99) (0.07) (0.01) (0.99) (0.07) (0.01) (0.99) (0.07) 
Health status: fair -0.094*** -0.336*** -0.350*** -0.080*** -0.346*** -0.337*** -0.092*** -0.335*** -0.355*** 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) 
Dependency: Katz1 0.137 3.011*** 1.159*** -0.040 -0.365 0.902*** 0.193* 2.164* 0.287 
 (0.11) (1.13) (0.31) (0.10) (1.10) (0.30) (0.12) (1.20) (0.33) 
Dependency: Katz2 0.233 4.349** 0.773 -0.081 -0.957 0.696 0.354* 3.617 -0.532 
 (0.16) (1.71) (0.47) (0.19) (1.99) (0.53) (0.21) (2.22) (0.62) 
Dependency: Katz3 0.223 5.249*** 1.719*** -0.159 -1.330 1.405* 0.338 4.005* 0.176 
 (0.18)  (0.53) (0.25) (0.85) (0.72) (0.21) (1.95) (0.62) 
Real wealth 
(€1,000,000 ) -0.001 -0.438*** -0.018 0.009 -0.157 0.041** -0.003 -0.306*** 0.059*** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) 
Real income (€1,000 €) -0.214 12.440*** -7.731*** 0.130 -2.212 -6.251*** -0.246 -6.888** -5.040*** 
 (0.36) (3.93) (1.12) (0.18) (2.24) (0.66) (0.26) (2.90) (0.86) 
Public healthcare 
expenditure. (1,000€) -0.083 -2.025** 0.572*** -0.076 -1.886** 0.328*** -0.089 -2.108** 0.484*** 
 (0.08) (0.91) (0.22) (0.08) (0.89) (0.22) (0.08) (0.92) (0.22) 
Infection rate 0.011 -0.997** -0.387*** 0.024 -0.918** -0.440*** 0.009 -1.087** -0.428*** 
 (0.04) (0.43) (0.12) (0.04) (0.46) (0.13) (0.04) (0.44) (0.12) 
Satisfaction with public 
healthcare system 0.001 0.004 -0.014*** 0.001 0.002 -0.015*** 0.001 0.004 -0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Public beds (1,000 
inhabitants) 0.005 -0.045 0.021 0.000 -0.020 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.028 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) (0.02) (0.18) (0.05) 
Constant  11.302*** 1.294  4.892** -0.413  4.851*** -0.493 
  (3.14) (0.85)  (1.98) (0.50)  (1.50) (0.39) 
N 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 14,766 1,705 1,705 
Year and regional dummies are not shown. *** means significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. 
F-test of residuals is distributed according to F(2,14726) for the logit model, F(2,1665) 
 
 
